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Ukraine needs a just and sustainable peace, not surrender

Amid the reinvigoration of negotiations over a potential peace agreement for Russia’s war in Ukraine, the danger of an unjust settlement has not disappeared. We formulated five essential points that any real peace plan for Ukraine would require, at minimum.

Image: Yan Dobronosov/AFP/ANP - People take shelter at a metro station during Russian air attacks in Kyiv on November 25, 2025, amid the Russian invasion of Ukraine.

On November 20, the Trump administration revealed a 28-point proposal for ending Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, following its negotiations with Russia without the involvement of Ukraine or European partners. This proposal – which resembled more a capitulation plan for Ukraine rather than a real peace agreement – raised shock and rejection in Kyiv and many European capitals alike. 

Following intense diplomatic exchanges between Ukraine’s leadership and European leaders, counter-proposals to the original US plan were developed that are based on Ukraine’s right to self-determination and more credible prospects for a secure future, both for Ukraine and Europe. Provisions of a potential peace agreement were subsequently negotiated in Geneva between the American and the Ukrainian sides, with involvement of key European governments representatives. While the reports from those negotiations eased some of the concerns about the US’ original plan, the negotiating process is far from over, and the extent to which the final deal will reflect Ukraine’s red lines and Europe’s long-term security concerns remains unclear.

The Dutch government has proven itself a strong ally of Ukraine in many respects since the beginning of the Russian full-scale invasion in 2022. The government, like other European governments and the EU, must not relent now and must make every effort to reach an end to the war, which would rightly bear the word “peace.”

Any real peace plan for Ukraine would require, at a minimum, the following points:

1. No territorial concessions

Any potential ceasefire agreement should be based on the current front line. Ukraine cannot be expected to relinquish unconquered territory in the Donbas – which is also the base for Ukraine’s most fortified positions – and with it, the future and security of Ukrainian citizens. The ceasefire line must not be accepted as a permanent border without an agreement with Ukraine. The occupied Donbas, Crimea, and other areas under Russian control should retain the status of occupied territory, with all obligations under international law to the occupying Russian army – which it has consistently violated, as evidenced by massive human rights violations, oppressions and forced russification on Russia-controlled Ukrainian territories. Accepting the shifting of borders through force would not only be fundamentally unjust for Ukrainian people, but would also set a very dangerous precedent and pave the way for other wars of conquest.

2. No impunity for war crimes

Europe must continue to work to prevent impunity for perpetrators of war crimes and keep the path open to truth-finding and justice for civilians who have fallen victim to Russia’s war of aggression. Impunity must not be accepted or built into a peace agreement. Russia must be held accountable for its aggression in Ukraine – including accountability for its war crimes and paying reparations for all the destruction it inflicted upon Ukraine. Therefore, international and European efforts should support documentation, truth-finding, and trial preparation for Russia’s wrongdoings in Ukraine. Accepting impunity is the axe to the very foundation of the international legal system.

3. Respect for Ukrainian sovereignty

A peace plan must uphold Ukraine’s sovereignty in deciding on its external and internal policies, including its aspirations for EU integration or NATO membership. EU Integration is a matter to be negotiated between Ukraine and the member states of the EU, not to be determined by either Russia or the US. But EU integration is a long road that will require significant adjustments to the rule of law and economic conditions in Ukraine, and only offers Ukrainian citizens prospects in the long term. European governments and the EU should make resources available immediately and for the long term to support Ukraine’s recovery and development not only through state-led efforts, but also by empowering bottom-up, citizen-driven initiatives. This would strengthen mutual solidarity and bring tangible benefits for the Ukrainian society even before the formal EU accession can be achieved.

4. No normalisation with the current Russian regime

Normalization with Russia and the lifting of sanctions are out of the question under the current regime. The war against Ukraine is the result of Russia’s drive for dominance and colonial aspirations. These are also dangerous for other European countries, particularly former Soviet republics. The ongoing acts of sabotage and interference by Russia are yet another reason why normalization is not an option. The old European approach of “Wandel durch Handel” cannot be revived with any peace plan. In the long term, European countries will have to take steps to develop a new security architecture that includes Russia, but with the current regime, little can be expected of this.

5. Europe must take responsibility

Europe will have to realize that the United States, especially under the Trump administration, is not an ally for the security of Ukraine or the rest of Europe, and is only interested in financial gain, trade interests, and the appropriation of raw materials. Europe will have to work towards ultimately offering effective security guarantees to Ukraine by itself, paving the way to a just and lasting peace for Ukrainian citizens.

In any peace arrangement that follows, Russia must be held accountable, not rewarded, for its aggression in Ukraine. Peace built on surrender, impunity, and territorial loss is no peace at all. Europe must stand firm for Ukrainian self-determination, justice, and long-term security.

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